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LAW, LEGITIMACY, AND SYMBOLS: AN 
EXP ANDED VIEW OF LAW AND SOCIETY 
IN TRANSITION 
Malcolm M. Feeley* 
LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW. By 
Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick. New York: Harper and Row. 
1978. Pp. 122. $4.95. 
In Law and Society in Transition, Philippe Nonet and Philip 
Selznick continue an inquiry they began in earlier works, 1 the 
celebration of the expansion of the rule of law. Although brief and 
undeveloped, this book nevertheless represents a major step for-
ward in their thinking. Their prior works presented a continuum 
of legality and examined the transformation of specific institu-
tions along a single dimension of evolving legality. Law and So-
ciety in Transition enriches and expands this effort by proposing 
a theory of the development of varying types and stages of legal-
ity. 
They posit three modes oflegal order, repressive law, autono~ 
mous law, and responsive law. Each is distinguished from the 
other by purpose, method, and source of legitimacy. Repressive 
law appeals to the primitive need for order and social defense and 
relies heavily on coercion. Autonomous law emphasizes proce-
dural regularity and predictability. Responsive law focusses on 
the substantive goals of the community and views law as an in-
strument for achieving them. 
The object of repressive law is order. It focusses on the most 
basic need of society, the preservation of social order. As such, 
law is subordinated to politics and relies heavily on brute force. 
Repressive law, as Nonet and Selznick characterize it, is a tool 
of political authority; it is the device by which those in political 
power seek to consolidate authority, command obedience, and 
legitimize their presence. One might be tempted to associate re-
pressive law with amorality, the substitution of the gunman for 
the priest. But, as Nonet and Selznick convincingly argue, the 
essence of repressive law is moralism. Ultimately its appeal is 
derived not from fear, but from the premise that only through the 
• Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin. B.A., Austin College; Ph.D. 
1969, University of Minnesota.-Ed. 
1. See, e.g., P. NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERN-
MENT AGENCY (1969); P. SELZNICK, LAw, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); Selznick, 
Sociology and Natural Law, 6 NAT. L. F. 84 (1961). 
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use of efficient exercise of force can the security and morality of 
social order be preserved. 
The object of autonomous law is to tame repression. Autono-
mous law celebrates the "rule of law" and the development of "a 
government of laws and not of men." The distinguishing charac-
teristics of autonomous laws are the separation of law and poli-
tics, the accountability of officials to the rule oflaw, the emphasis 
on procedures, and the insistence that rules be obeyed and that 
criticism and efforts to change be channelled through established 
legal institutions and procedures. Disobedience is tolerated only 
to the extent that its object is to challenge the validity of statutes. 
Responsive law reflects a concern with substance. It acknowl-
edges the stultifying effects of legalism and recognizes that how-
ever detailed the substantive law might be it remains an imper-
fect instrument for capturing and expressing the impulses and 
strivings of a complex community. While acknowledging the need 
to curb political authority and the desire for regUlarity, respon-
sive law pursues accountability not solely in terms of compliance 
to rigid rules, but through fidelity to the substantive aims of the 
law. Unlike autonomous law, where rigid rules are in danger of 
becoming ends in themselves, responsive law focusses on 
principles within the law; they are open-textured, allowing for 
debate, change, and adjustment. Principles point to goals and 
suggest directions, but do not necessarily supply the detailed 
guides to decide concrete cases. 
These views of legal authority correspond closely to different 
emphases in classical jurisprudence; repressive law is linked to 
the philosophical perspectives of Hobbes, John Austin, and 
Marx. Autonomous law is associated with Hans Kelsen. Respon-
sive law is joined to the tradition of the sociological jurisprudence 
of Roscoe Pound and the philosophical perspectives of Ronald 
Dworkin and John Dewey. Those categorizations, the authors 
take pains to emphasize, are only, ideal types: "Any given legal 
order or legal institution is likely to have a 'mixed' character, 
incorporating aspects of all three types of law."2 But, they con-
tinue, "although a legal order will exhibit elements of all types, 
its basic posture may nevertheless approximate one type more 
closely than the others. "3 
Having developed these ideal types of law, the authors go on 
2. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAw AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD REsPONSIVE LAW 
17 (1978). 
3. Id. 
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to outline an evolutionary theory of legal development. They see 
in the legal order an "inner dynamic" in which certain conditions 
generate pressure for change, thereby producing a developmental 
sequence. According to Nonet and Selznick, the legal order begins 
with repressive law-a response to the primitive need for order 
and security-which then gives birth to the desire to "tame" force 
through autonomous law and procedure. In turn, the rigidities of 
autonomous law give rise to impatience with formality, and the 
impulse for a more socially responsive legal order. 
While readers are treated to an insightful discussion of legal 
styles and functions, the logic and dynamic of the evolutionary 
model is not very convincing. The ambitions of their opening 
discussion dissolve in subsequent chapters, in part perhaps be-
cause the brevity of discussion is in inverse proportion to their 
task .. This is but one weakness of the book. There are numerous 
additional problems that should puzzle students of law and so-
ciety. For instance their analysis is curiously concentrated on 
what might be called the inner logic of the law. While not alto-
gether ignoring the "external" social forces shaping law, they 
nevertheless give them short shrift. And for a book about law and 
authority, their book is curiously lacking in discussion of law and 
politics. These problems may stem from their developmental 
approach, a perspective that emphasizes the "inner-logic" of the 
law. "A developmental model," they hold, "proposes that certain 
states of a system will generate forces leading to specified 
changes."4 
Although the authors purport to present an evolutionary 
model, there is little to convince the reader that the three 
"stages" occur in any sequence. Indeed the authors themselves 
are ambivalent about their developmental model. At one point 
they observe: 
It is helpful if it [a developmental model] successfully identi-
fies characteristic stresses, problems, opportunities, expectations, 
and emergent adaptations. These may and do suggest the direction 
of change, but they cannot tell us what will actually happen, since 
that always depends on widely varying conditions and countervail-
ing forces.5 
Elsewhere they further indicate the problematic nature of this 
· scheme when they point out that autonomous law is especially 
4. Id. at 23. 
5. Id. 
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unstable and can easily degenerate into either repressive or re-
sponsive law. 
In light of this tentativeness, one wonders why they bothered 
to argue for a "developmental" approach at all. More simply and 
perhaps appropriately they may only have identified different 
elements of all legal systems, distinct features that must coexist 
in perpetual tension. Law is much too complex and multi-faceted 
an institution to have a single or even dominant goal or style; it 
encompasses a bewildering array of goals and orientations all of 
which can exist simultaneously in any legal system. At different 
periods, one or another of these characteristics may be more 
salient in the public's eye than the others, but temporary saliency 
is quite different from distinct stages. 
This problem in their developmental approach is apparent 
once a concerted effort is made to apply it. While the authors 
expect it to hold for the "broad sweep of history," it is not clear 
whether this time span signifies time immemorial, the last one 
hundred years, or the past decade. Are we, for instance, expected 
to see this sequence unfold in the development of western civiliza-
tion, or is it a pattern discernible in American law since Viet 
Nam? What is even more telling than the authors' failure of spec-
ification is the sympathetic reader's inability to determine. 
Related to this is the question of the type of law to which they 
refer. One gets the impression that they have in mind judicial 
decisions in common-law countries (most of their examples are 
Anglo-American) and perhaps American constitutional law. But 
if their model is as general as they seem to imply, it must cer-
tainly apply to systems other than common law and the peculiari-
ties of American constitutional law. Despite this, no reference is 
made to nonwestern concepts of law. Nor is legislation discussed; 
indeed the term is not even found in the index. For a book titled 
Law and Society in Transition, and focussing disproportionately 
on modern industrialized societies, this omission is surprising. 
There are, however, more fundamental problems in their 
analysis. It is not clear at what level their analysis is to be ap-
plied. Let me illustrate by turning to another legal realist who 
also sought to attempt to elicit pa,tterns in the development of 
law. In his magnum opus, The Common Law Tradition, Karl 
Llewellyn identified two "styles" of appellate court decision-
making, the Formal Style and the Grand Style.6 The Formal 
Style views legal reasoning as a mechanical process, where the 
6. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRAnmoN (1960). 
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task of the judge is to apply the facts to the rules in order to 
formulate conclusions .. In contrast the Grand Style is flexible. It 
takes cognizance of social conditions and looks behind the legal 
rules to the aims of the law. Here the judge's role is seen as 
purposive and creative and the good judge is one who can under-
stand the temper of the times, the substantive aims of the law, 
and in doing so shape both. 
Llewellyn's analysis yields considerable insight into the na-
ture of the judicial process, but as many critics have observed, his 
analysis fails to distinguish between two quite different things: 
how a judge arrives at a decision, and how he writes about it. For 
instance, Llewellyn labelled Supreme Court opinions handed 
down around the turn of the century as Formal, while he classi-
fied earlier decisions as Grand. If one looks at writing style, he is 
certainly correct; there is a world of difference in the opinions of 
John Marshall and James MacReynolds. But if one looks not at 
the Court's style, but its actions, his classification becomes prob-
lematic. Constitutional laWYers are quite fond of arguing that 
despite the mechanical style of its opinions, the decisions by the 
Old Court were extremely "activist," often ignoring prece-
dent, inventing nonexistent distinctions, and generally torturing 
the law to arrive at conclusions compatible with the dominant 
conservative inclinations of the times-criticisms others have 
made of the Court under John Marshall and Earl Warren. 
In short, style can mask content and action, and as with 
Llewellyn's scheme, Nonet and Selznick's discussion does not 
adequately clarify the level of analysis. It is not clear whether 
they want to focus on substance, style, or neither-since they are 
interested ultimately in law and legitimacy. How would they clas-
sify the Supreme Court's major constitutional decisions in the 
first third of this century? Were they autonomous because their 
style was "mechanical"? Repressive because they dampened leg-
islative quests for change? Or responsive because they captured 
the impulses of American Babbitry? How would they assess the 
Warren Court's landmark rulings dealing with the rights of the 
accused-as indications of autonomous law because they fo-
cussed on procedure, or responsive because they sought to imple-
ment an ideal about how a civilized society should respond to the 
criminally accused? 
In developing their analysis the authors should have reflected 
more extensively on the use and function of symbols in public life. 
Political legitimacy, Harold Lasswell finally convinced us, de-
pends not only on the specific actions of governments, but also 
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on the successful presentation of symbols.7 This thesis has been 
developed at length by numerous social scientists. Perhaps the 
most prominent is Murray Edelman, whose work on language, 
politics, and symbols has focussed on the disjunctures of political 
symbols and actions.8 "For most of the public," Edelman ob-
serves, politics "is a parade of abstractions."9 This does not mean 
that politics fails to engage the interest of citizens. Indeed, Edel-
man argues it is just the reverse: "Psychological distance from 
symbols that evoke perceptions and emotions heightens their po-
tency rather than reducing it. Few principles are more centrally 
involved in the working of government."10 
If Edelman is correct about politics and, one might add, the 
law, what are the implications for social analysis? To him they 
are obvious: 
Political analysis must, then, proceed on two levels simultane-
ously. It must examine how political actions get some groups the , 
tangible things they want from government and at the same titne 
it must explore what these same actions mean to the mass public 
and how it is aroused or placated by them.11 
The truth Edelman asserts for political analysis also holds for 
socio-legal analysis. Yet it is precisely their failure to distinguish 
these two levels that diminishes the power of Nonet and Selz-
nick's study. Interested as they are in the bases of legitimacy, 
they cannot proceed very far because they have not probed both 
the expressive and symbolic level on one hand and the instrumen-
tal and practical level on the other. Like many dichotomies this 
distinction is oversimplified, but nevertheless it does make an 
important point: by failing to distinguish levels of analysis, the 
authors fail to make problematic the central focus of their investi-
gation, the relation of legal legitimacy to actual legal practices. 
The result is an insightful discussion, but one ultimately lacking 
analytic power. 
I have dealt with this point at some length not so much to 
disagree with what appears to be Nonet and Selznick's optimism 
for the future or their pluralist politics, but to point out that they 
have not dealt adequately with the major issues inherent in their 
7. H. LAswEL~, POLITICS: WHo GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1936). 
8. See, e.g .• POLITICAL LANGUAGE: WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POLICIES THAT FAIL 
(1977); POLITICS AS SYMBOLIC ACTION: MASS AROUSAL AND QUIESCENCE (1971); THE SYMBOLIC 
UsES OF POLITICS (1964). See also T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GovERMENT (1935). 
9. J. M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 10 (1964). 
10. Id. at 11. 
11. Id. at 12. 
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topic, issues which engage a good number of students of law and 
society. To do so would have required them to dissect the anom-
alies of legal systems and legal realities, rather than assuming the 
distinction away. One need not be a Marxist or even a quiet, 
passive class theorist to deal seriously with the assertions that 
law, like politics, can provide potent symbols that mask contrary 
practices or that the jurist's view oflaw may not be shared by the 
mass public. 
At a minimum this position simply asserts that there is a 
disjuncture between appearance and reality and that appear-
ances sometimes deceive, intentionally or not. What must be 
made problematic in any discussion of law, legitimacy, and au-
thority is the examination of this disjuncture. 
Ultimately the conclusions drawn from such an analysis may 
depend upon the assumptions, values, and political theory one 
brings to one's work. Given this, the reader should expect an 
author's perspective to be placed up front, not glossed over by 
caricature and ridicule of dissenting views. Unfortunately, Nonet 
and Selznick fall into this bad habit when they dismiss some 
"conflict theorists." Although it is easy to agree with their criti-
cism of Howard Zinn's assertion that modern American law is a 
conspiracy of "congealed injustice," one wonders why they both-
ered to deal with this assertion, obviously made more for rhetori-
cal than analytic purposes. Their topic is more serious than this 
and there are more serious opponents than Zinn. Nonet and Selz-
nick do their own position no great service by seizing on such 
rhetoric while ignoring the much more interesting perspective 
that underlies it. For instance, had they decided to follow Edel-
man's advice-he is by no means a doctrinaire theorist-they 
would have had to clarify their levels of analysis and in the pro-
cess significantly improve their work. 
I do not want to suggest that all grand theories or that all 
developmental theories about law are impossible. Selznick and 
Nonet would probably even agree with me that only grand theory 
is worth talking about. There are also some promising efforts at 
constructing developmental theories of law. Richard Schwartz 
and James Miller have developed and tested an evolutionary 
model of legal institutions12 and more recently Donald Black has 
offered a general theory of the expansion of the scope of the law .13 
12. Schwartz & Miller, Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity, 70 AM. J. Soc. 159, 
159-60 (1964). 
13. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAw (1976). 
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Schwartz and Miller are interested in exploring the relationship 
of societal complexity and the growth of legal specialization-a 
particular application of Durkheim's thesis about division of 
labor. Black's recent book attempts to explain the expansion of 
the scope of the law. Given his inclusive definition of law-it is 
virtually synonymous with official governmental action-his 
study might better be characterized as an examination of the 
expansion of the public sector generally. Both these efforts are 
much more modest than Nonet and Selznick's effort, but they do 
have the virtue of clearly specifying the object and level of their 
analyses. 
This is not to slight Nonet and Selznick's ambitions, only to 
wish they had risen to the occasion. In seeking to understand the 
evolutionary nature of the "spirit of the laws," they appear to be 
offering a theory of the moral development of society, the social 
equivalent of what Piaget, Kohlberg, and others have tried to do 
for individuals. Aside from the problems I have already raised, 
such an enterprise is risky, something they freely admit. It lends 
itself to all the problems of reification and the objections to teleo-
logical explanation. This too they recognize. But being candid 
about problems does not solve them, and despite their frankness, 
Nonet and Selznick make no serious effort to overcome the vol-
umes of objections that modern social science has brought to bear 
on the subject. Nor do they frame their analysis to avoid the 
pitfalls. 
It is this focus on the inner morality of law or the "spirit of 
the law" that also leads them to search for a self-contained ex-
planation for changes in law rather than to seek them in 
"external" social conditions. But by being caught up in the 
internal development of the legal order, the analysis is apolitical, 
a curious state of affairs for a study of authority and legitimacy. 
Despite these criticisms, I can appreciate the ambition of 
their quest; Nonet and Selznick want to understand the norma-
tive appeals of institutions of social control in modern complex 
societies. I think there is merit in the quest. However, I am not 
convinced that the effort is really one of understanding law in 
society, as the authors clearly intend it to be. Rather it seems an 
effort more appropriately directed at the moral appeals of 
political authority generally. But as I have argued, "The Law" is 
not a coherent institution; it is multifaceted and as such relies on 
a variety of supports. Although in the United States the Constitu-
tion-and through it law generally-does serve as an important 
national symbol, "The Law" is rarely perceived as a distinct and 
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coherent institution or symbol. Law is too diverse and amor-
phous, and in most cultures I doubt seriously whether there is any 
dominant or modal legal morality of the sort Nonet and Selznick 
discuss. Law insinuates itself into our lives in too many and too 
complex ways to allow for this. In contrast, national political 
authority, often personified in a single office or person, can and 
inevitably does offer itself as an institution symbolizing morality 
and legitimacy. Given their concerns, Nonet and Selznick's dis-
cussion may be directed more appropriately at different bases on 
which political authority, not law, rests. One might even argue 
that most modern governments aspire to a legitimacy based on 
legality, and that given this what is needed is a typology expand-
ing the meaning of rational-legal authority. To this extent, Nonet 
and Selznick may have supplied a valuable point of departure. 
Thus, surprisingly, a presentation that lacks a developed political 
dimension may be most useful in guiding political, not legal, 
analysis. 
After perusing a copy of Law and Society in Transition, a 
colleague of mine remarked, "Such a big title for such a little 
book." I agree. I hope, however, that Nonet and Selznick eventu-
ally will write the big book implied in their title. If they do, it will 
be a good one. 
